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AN OPEC IN FANTASYLAND? 
The NAB Television Code as Cartel 
Abstract 
The u.s.- Justice Department filed suit against the 
National Association of Broadcasters in 1979, charging that its 
Television Code restricted the supplg of advertising. Had the 
case, which was settled by consent decree in 1982, gone to trial 
under a "rule of reason," the cartel effects of the code would 
have been examined. 
This paper emplogs a "dummy endogenous variable" model to 
see if the code provided cartel benefits. The results suggest 
that subscribing stations received higher profits, but that these 
cannot be unambiguously ascribed to cartel effects of the code. 
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AN OPEC IN FANTASYLAND? 
The NAB Television Code as Cartel* 
{Introduction} 
In June 1979, the Antitrust Division of the 
U.S. Justice l Department filed suit against the National 
Association of Broadcasters {NAB}, charging that certain 
provisions of its Television Code constituted unreasonable 
restraint of trade and commerce in violation of the Sherman Act. 
The questionable provisions regulated the quantity, length, 
placement, and format of "non-program material" {commercials and 
promotional announcements} code subscribers could broadcast. 
These advertising restrictions were eliminated from the code when 
the case was settled by consent decree in November 1982. 
It is well-established in economic theory and in case law 
that a trade association like the NAB may facilitate collusion by 
firms in the industry. If the association's efforts are 
successful, industry profit increases. Was the NAB's Television 
Code an instrument of collusion? Clearly the Justice Department 
thought so and it can be argued that NAB and code practices fell 
into the category of proscribed behavior as established by legal 
~ * 
1 The authors are grateful to William Greene, William Mason, 
and Albert Anderson for programming assistance, and to Kenneth 
Boyer and Rick Bold for reading the preliminary draft. The usual 
nostra culpa applies. 
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precedent in trade association cases. If true, and if the suit 
. had been tried in court under a per se rule, the NAB would have 
lost. Thus, the consent decree may have protected the NAB from 
subsequent treble-damage suits. But many observers of the 
commercial broadcasting industry considered the code to be 
ineffective, unenforceable, and honored as often as not in the 
breach. Under a "rule of reason," applied in most court 
decisions involving trade association conspiracy, the question of 
the actual anticompetitive effect of the code arises. 
The effect of the code is analyzed in this paper. Part 
One discusses the history of the NAB and the Television Code and 
summarizes the implications of a model of a television trade 
association. Part Two follows the course of the government 
antitrust suit and makes some conjectures regarding legal 
interpretation of NAB code practices. Part Three employs a 
"dummy endogenous variable" (DEV) model to assess whether code­
member TV stations were more profitable than non-members, and 
whether stations were relatively more profitable if they served a 
market where a high proportion of stations were code members. 
Part Four summarizes findings: that code membership was 
profitable, but that this increased profitability was not due to 
collusive output restrictions. 
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1. Background 
1.1 The Commercial Television Industry 
A commercial television station broadcasts programs and 
non-program material, including paid advertisements, to a viewing 
audience free of charge. The station's programs corne from a 
network (if the station is a network affiliate), from syndicators 
who deliver tapes of programs (e.g., old movies) to stations, and 
from the station's own production facilities (e.g., news shows). 
Station revenue comes from sale of commercial time on programs 
and from payments from networks for showing network programs and 
commercials. 
Advertisers in turn purchase commercial air time in order 
to produce customer advertising response -- increased sales. A 
national advertiser can buy network advertising time carried 
nationwide by the network's affiliated stations. Regional 
advertisers purchase advertising time from an agent representing 
several stations or from program syndicators. Local advertisers 
purchase advertising time directly from one or more local 
stations. Television commercials represent sponsorship of a 
program period, participation with other advertisers in 
sponsorship, or spot announcements inserted between program 
periods. 
The individual station acts to maximize profit. The 
profit function is of the form: 
R = pnA(n,q,k',z') - C(q) (1) 
where R = station profit per period; 
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p = price per commercial exposure; 
n = number of commercials shown by station; 
A = station's audience size (commercial exposures 
per commercial); 
q = program quality; 
k = vector of program characteristics other than quality; 
z = vector of effects varying with the number of competing 
stations and the quality and timing of their programs; 
C = station cost. 
The price per commercial exposure (p) is not observed in 
the market. Advertisers are interested in showing their 
commercial to viewers and are only willing to pay to show 
commercials if viewers are exposed to those commercials. The 
price paid by an advertiser to show a commercial is thus directly 
related to the number of people who are exposed to the 
commercial. 
The model assumes 3A/3n < 0, 3A/3q > 0, and 3C/3q > o. 
As the number of commercials (n) increases, the number of viewers 
of the program (A) falls. If program quality (q) increases, the 
number of viewers increases. Program cost (C) is an increasing 
function of program quality. 
The station, in the absence of regulatory or trade 
association restraints, takes price of commercial exposures (p) 
and actions of other stations (z) as given and chooses number of 
commercials (n), program quality (q), and those program 
characteristics under its control (k) to maximize profit (R). 
Program quality depends in part on signal clarity, which varies 
with assigned channel, antenna height, and power output. 
Commercials are costly to the station, even though the station 
does not physically produce them, because an additional 
commercial reduces audience size. The first-order conditions for 
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maximizing equation (1) include the requirement that oR/on = 
npoA/on + pA = o. Competitive stations sell * n commercials atc 
which the marginal revenue of an additional commercial, pA, 
equals the marginal opportunity cost in lost viewers, -npoA/on. 
The price of commercial exposures is a function of the 
quantity produced in the industry. Under competition or 
oligopolistic rivalry, stations compete for viewers (and profit), 
reducing the price of commercial exposures to some competitive 
level. By contrast, a trade association seeking to increase 
industry profit will (1) restrict output and/or raise price, (2) 
establish and maintain barriers to entry, and (3) monitor and 
enforce compliance by association members. A television trade 
association is hindered somewhat in the achievement of the first 
objective by the difficulty of defining, measuring, and 
monitoring the price and quantity of the industry's output, 
commercial exposures. The number of commercials is easy to 
measure, however, and this may be sufficient to increase industry 
profit. 1 
If only the number of commercials is controlled, stations 
can compete by altering program quality and other program 
characteristics. Whether this non-price competition dissipates 
all potential cartel profit depends on the marginal cost and 
benefit to individual stations of non-price competition and on 
the nature of viewer response to changes in program quality and 
lReducing the number of commercials reduces the number 
of commercial exposures produced since, for an interior maximum, 
the increase in number of viewers must be smaller than the 
reduction in the number of commercial exposures due to fewer 
commercials. 
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characteristics. Although some cartel profit will be dissipated 
through non-price competition, sufficient profit may remain to 
justify trade association restriction on number of commercials. 
1.2 The NAB and Implications of the Model 
-This section briefly reviews the history of the NAB and 
shows how industry behavior conforms in many respects to the 
predictions of the model outlined· above. 
The National Association of Broadcasters was formed in 
1923 during a time of confusion and conflict in the fledgling 
radio broadcast industry. RCA and AT&T were trying to extend 
their patent monopolies on crucial components of radio receivers 
and transmitters, the second Washington Radio Conference was 
allocating frequency bands on the radio spectrum to reduce mutual 
station interference, and the. American Society of Composers, 
Authors and Publishers was demanding royalty fees for use of 
copyrighted music and material used on the air [Barnouw (1966), 
pp. 114-21]. By banding together in what must have been 
perceived as self-defense, commercial radio stations felt they 
could better protect their interests. 
The NAB's role in the industry, which has changed little 
since the early years, consists of lobbying for broadcast 
interests, providing services to members, and promoting industry 
"self-regulation." The principal instrument of self-regulation 
has been the issuance of "codes" whose provisions are divided 
between programming ethics and advertising standards. The first 
NAB radio code was ratified in 1929 and the first television code 
in 1952. 
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Self-regulation can serve three purposes. Publishing 
ethical standards of conduct builds good public relations, 
important for an industry that wants to be "invited into the 
nation's living rooms." Also, by giving the appearance of 
policing themselves, commercial broadcasters may be able to 
forestall more inflexible or undesirable regulation by the FCC 
and other government agencies. Finally, by facilitating the 
exchange of market and cost information, providing focal point 
pricing and output levels for advertising, and monitoring station 
compliance with code recommendations, a trade association may 
"organize" the industry in anti-competitive ways. It is the 
ability of the NAB to accomplish this last task which is the 
principal concern of this paper. 
The behavioral model predicts that a profit-maximizing 
association of broadcasters wants higher barriers to entry than 
would occur under competition. 2 Historical evidence supports 
this predictions. The NAB, the networks, and ad hoc groups of 
large stations have continually and successfully lobbied Congress 
and the FCC for restrictions on the rate of entry of additional 
stations and substitute technologies. 
A good example is provided by the DuMont controversy in 
1952. In that year, after a four-year freeze on licensing new 
applicants, the FCC produced a table of new station and frequency 
assignments. Stations were more geographically dispersed than 
2The television market in a large metropolitan area can 
often be described as a dominant group of high-powered VHF and 
network-affiliated stations, accompanied by a competitive fringe 
of UHF and mostly non-commercial stations. Restrictions on entry 
into the dominant group are most valued by the NAB. 
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. they would have been under unregulated competition, since small 
communities often had unused frequencies allotted to them, while 
in larger cities some license applications were denied. The 1952 
allocation did increase somewhat the number of channels assigned 
to large, established television markets, but not by as much as 
was technically feasible. The DuMont Television Network needed 
more VHF channels in large cities to survive, and presented a 
technically viable proposal to the FCC.. Under pressure from 
existing networks and television interests, however, the 
commission rejected the DuMont plan [FCC (1952)]. Shortly 
thereafter, DuMont ceased operation. 
Cable television provides another example of NAB efforts 
to restrict entry. In the early years of cable development 
neither the NAB nor the FCC paid much attention to cable 
television systems. As cable penetrated larger markets and 
competed with VHF broadcasters, however, the trade association 
began its opposition. In 1974 for example, the NAB spent or 
committed over $800,000 to restrict cable and subscription 
television growth [Broadcasting (7 October 1974), pp. 3,6]. Due 
to NAB efforts, FCC regulatory restrictions on cable grew apace. 
Although the commission began relaxing its most restrictive cable 
television rules after 1980, the FCC generally continues to 
support network and NAB desires for obstacles to entry by new 
stations and technologies. 3 
3In more recent years a rivalry has grown between 
existing commercial broadcasters and low power VHF "drop in" 
stations, direct broadcast satellite systems and "pay television" 
in the form of multipoint distribution services. Cornell and 
Webbink write: "Today new applicants and new services bear the 
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The model also predicts that a trade association wants to 
. restrict the number of commercials and so restrict the nUITLber of 
commercial exposures. The advantage of choosing number of 
commercials as the target fo! cartel restriction is obvious. 
Owen, Beebe, and Manning write: 
The price and quantity of advertising time is relatively 
easy to agree .upon, because the market is well organized 
and well informed, and because cheating can quickly be 
detected. Also, the NAB code limits on the number of 
commercial minutes per hour provide a convenient process 
for agreement ••• [(1974), p. 104]. 
The Television Code limits the number of commercial 
minutes per hour, the number of consecutive commercials, and the 
number of products which can be advertised in one commercial. 
These restrictions, while consistent with a pattern of output 
reduction by a cartel, may also reflect the notion that self ­
regulation averts formal regulation. In 1964, for example, the 
FCC, concerned about the "over-commercialization" of 
broadcasting, considered adopting the NAB's advertising 
restrictions as its own regulatory standard. The NAB resisted 
vigorously (and successfully), motivated by the desire to 
preserve the flexibility of self-regulation: 
The NAB television and radio codes were constantly held 
up by industry spokesmen as shining examples of self ­
regulation, though regarded by many broadcasters as a 
charade. Most of its edicts had built-in escape hatches, 
and the few clear rules -- such as those dealing with the 
time to be devoted to commercials -- were widely ignored. 
An FCC sampling of stations in 1963 found that 40 per 
cent had advertising exceeding the code limits [Barnouw 
(1970), pp. 250-51]. 
burden of showing [the FCC] that their proposed 'services are 
wanted by the public and would not hurt existing firms" [(1983), 
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It would seem that commercial reduction by FCC edict is less 
desirable to the industry than reduction by "selective adherence" 
to the NAB's Television Code. Under the latter, "it is doubtful 
that prices and quantities thus set would depart very much from 
competitive levels" [Owen, Beebe and Manning (1974), p. 104].4 
For successful cartelization of broadcasting, the NAB 
must encourage membership, monitor compliance with cartel 
restrictions, and detect and penalize cheating and free riders. 
The NAB's monitoring capability is strong and efficiently 
centralized, and membership seems not to have been a problem. 
NAB member television stations do not have to subscribe to the 
Television Code, and code subscribers need not be members of the 
NAB. But of 630 commercial television stations in 1970, 86 
percent belonged to the NAB and 65 percent subscribed to the code 
[Head (1972), table 22.1]. By 1979, "some 77% of all television 
stations in the top 50 markets -- stations that reach 70% of all 
television households in the country" were code subscribers 
[Broadcasting (18 June 1979), p. 27]. 
NAB membership and code compliance are encouraged by 
several means. The NAB provides services to members at low cost, 
including engineering and legal help, broadcast and audience 
research, a news bureau and library, and publications dealing 
with FCC regulations and licensing procedures. A separate NAB 
Code Authority monitors member programs. Although primarily a 
4NAB restrictions on advertising were frequently 
modified in the twenty-two editions of the Television Code which 
appeared between 1952 and 1982. When the FCC finally enacted its 
own limits on commercial minutes in 1973, they were less 
restrictive than the NAB's. 
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means of measuring compliance with code restrictions, this 
monitoring can be very helpful to the stations at license renewal 
time. By checking member broadcasts, the Code Authority can help 
stations adhere to implied FCC and Federal Trade Commission 
standards regarding news policy, public service announcements, 
children's programming and toy commercials, and allowable amounts 
of sex, violence, and anti-social behavior during the family 
viewing hour. The ability to deny some of these valuable 
services to non-members and to detect, expose, and/or expel code 
violators, gives the trade association the potential to 
administer and sustain at least moderate cartel restrictions on 
output. 5 
2. The Antitrust Suit Against the Television· Code 
2.1 Legal History 
The Justice Department suit against the Television Code 
grew out of an earlier case against the three major networks. In 
1972 the Department charged NBC, CBS, and ABC with violation of 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The complaint accused the 
networks of monopolizing prime time programming, including 
refusal "to offer air time to advertisers and other outside 
program suppliers seeking to have their own programs shown on the 
network" [U.S. v. NBC (1974)]. As the case proceeded, the NAB's 
Television Code carne under scrutiny, and on June 14, 1979, the 
5Some authors might disagree -- see Barnouw (1970), 
p. 251, and Head (1972), pp. 470-71. 
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Justice Department filed suit against the NAB in the 
. U.S. District Court, Washington,.D.C. 
The government's complaint alleged: 
• that the NAB had violated Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act (15 U.S.C. 1), by combining and conspiring to 
restrain trade. Specifically ••. the NAB had 
promulgated and enforced a television code" certain 
provisions of which restricted the quantity, placement, 
and format of television advertisements [47 Fed. Reg. 
32813 (29 July 1982)]. 
Four sets of television code advertising rules were 
challenged:' (1) commercial time limitations, (2) program 
interruptions, (3) consecutive announcements, and (4) mUltiple 
product advertisements. Briefly, the code defined "non-program 
material" to include commercials, promotional announcements, and 
credits exceeding a specified length. Paragraph XIV of the 22d 
edition of the code set limits for network affiliates: 9.5 
minutes of non-program material per hour during prime time and 16 
minutes per hour at other times; two interruptions per half hour 
during prime time and four per half hour at other times; and up 
to four consecutive commercials per interruption. Paragraph XV 
set limits for independent stations: 7 minutes of commercials 
per half hour in prime time and 8 minutes per half hour at other 
times; up to four interruptions per half hour, or seven per hour, 
or 13 in two hours; up to four announcements per interruption. 
Paragraph IX prohibited advertising two or more separate products 
in an announcement of less than 60 seconds. A variety of 
'The Radio Code and provisions of the Television Code 
not related to advertising were not affected by the suit. The 
challenged paragraphs of the code are reprinted in Appendix A of 
u.s. v. NAB (1982). The complete code is printed in NAB (1981). 
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exceptions or additions to these limits was applied to children's 
. programming, news and sports programs, and short features. 
The government's suit claimed that, as a result of the 
above code provisions, "purchasers of televi~ion advertising time 
have been deprived of the benefits of free and open competition
 
among television broadcasters" [quoted in Broadcasting (18 June
 
1979), p. 27]. The NAB countered that (1) the associa£ion's 
attempts to avoid over-commercialization were valued by the 
public,' (2) subscription to the code was voluntary, (3) the 
government needed to show an anti-competitive purpose to the 
code, and (4) the code was "endorsed" by the FCC and other 
government agencies. The Justice Department responded that (1) 
fear of losing viewers would prompt indivjdual stations to avoid 
over-commercialization without NAB help,s (2) the code was "not 
a mere set of advisory standards which subscribers may choose to 
ignore, but a contractual arrangement to which they are obligated 
to adhere," (3) the intent of the code was open to debate, but 
"anticompetitive effect would be enough to prove a violation of 
the law," and (4) endorsement of the code by government bodies 
other than Congress does not confer antitrust immunity.' 




SAfter the code advertising provlslons were suspended in 
1982, the only restrictions on commercials were those adopted by 
the FCC in 1973: 16 minutes per hour for all stations (20 
minutes during political campaigns). Recent FCC staff studies 
have found that most stations are well below these limits 
[Smyntek and Peterson (1984); Donovan (1984)]. 
'The charges and countercharges listed above are quoted 
or paraphrased in Broadcasting [(8 March 1982), pp. 37-38]. 
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In March 1982 the District Court issued a surnrn,ary 
. judgment requiring the NAB to suspend enforcement of the multiple 
product rule (paragraph IX); the NAB immediately suspended 
enforcement of all the challenged code rules. In July the 
Justice Department filed a proposed consent decree and the NAB 
accepted, reasoning that continued litigation would be costly, 
that they were losing the case, and that loss after trial would 
expose the association to subsequent private suits and treble-
damage claims [Broadcasting (19 July 1982), p. 39]. The decree 
was officially entered on November 23, 1982. By its provisions, 
the NAB immediately canceled the challenged portions of 
paragraphs IX, XIV, and XV of the code, and agreed not to 
reinstate them for ten years [U.S. v. NAB (1982)]. 
2.2 The "Rule of Reason" "and Trade Association Cases 
As of a decade ago, the Justice Department routinely 
filed about ten cases a year against trade associations, the 
majority of which ended in consent decrees [Wilcox and Shepherd 
(1975), p. 162]. Cases actually going to trial in the 1920-50 
era usually involved industrial and retail trade associations, 
but more recently self-regulation by professional associations 
has come under closer antitrust scrutiny. Trade associations are 
most commonly charged with some form of price-fixing violation of 
the Sherman Act, Section 1 of which prohibits a "contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce•••• " 
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price-fixing conspiracy is usually subject to a per se 
.prohibition,lO but trade association price-fixing seems to be an 
exception, and naturally so. Trade association activities often 
include price reporting systems. These systems are said to 
improve market functioning under some conditions and to 
facilitate collusion under others. According to Wilcox and 
Shepherd, for these systems to avert antitrust challenge: 
[they] will need to: (1) be fully available to all 
sellers and buyers, (2) not identify traders, (3) cover 
only past sales, not present or planned ones, (4) avoid 
circulating average prices (focal points for new price 
agreements), and (5) be free of any controls or penalties 
on sellers [(1975), p. 160; emphasis in original]. 
Thus, price reporting is not per se illegal; a court must examine 
the circumstances surrounding a plan and the "consequences 
flowing from it," -- in other wbrds, apply a "rule of reason." 
Even in United states v. Container Corp. of America, et ale [393 
u.S. 333 (1969)], ~here the courts came close to applying a per 
se rule to a trade association case, the structure of the market, 
elasticity of demand, and the "stabilizing" effects of the 
sharing of price information were all taken into account before a 
verdict was reached. ll 
The ~AB's Television Code was not a price reporting 
scheme. However, it did serve as a focal point for present and 
lOUnder a per se prohibition, there is "no need for the 
reasonableness of fixed prices to be considered •••• This is the 
basic statement of the per se approach: The action is by itself 
illegal; the circumstances surrounding the action, and the 
consequences flowing from it, are irrelevant" [Asch (1983), 
p. 210; emphasis changed from original]. 
lIThe Supreme Court decision is excerpted in Stelzer 
(1981). The evolution of trade association price-fixing case law 
is briefly traced in Asch (1983), pp. 214-17. 
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planned future restrictions of output (i.e., number and length of 
commercials), and there were penalties (exposure, expulsion) on 
sellers who did not adhere to the code's provisions. It seems 
clear that the Justice Department's case against the code fits 
into the standard trade association category. It follows from 
legal precedent and from the District Court's responses noted in 
the previous section that, had the case gone to trial, a 
"reasonableness test" may well have been applied. 12 If so, the 
question of the actual anticompetitive effects of the code's 
advertising restrictions would have arisen. It is this empirical 
question which the remainder of this paper addresses. 
3. Empirical Analysis of Code Effects 
3.1 Hypotheses and Data 
Previous sections demonstrated that (a) it is 
theoretically possible for a cartel to raise station profits by 
restricting the number of commercials, even though the industry's 
output is commercial exposures, but (b) the NAB television code 
authority appears to have had only weak enforcement sanctions for 
effecting a significant cartel restriction of this nature. 
Nevertheless, television stations subscribed to the code, and the 
Department of Justice filed a Sherman action against it. Thus, 
the possibility that the code functioned as an effective supply-
reducing cartel must be entertained. 
12In preliminary arguments the NAB specifically asked for 
a rule of reason interpretation of the case, while the Justice 
Department requested application of per se [Broadcasting (10 
December 1979), p. 93]. 
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The investigation below is predicated on the assumption 
. that if the code constituted a successful cartel device, 
television station profits will have been higher as a result. 
Two "empirical hypotheses" are tested. First, code membership is 
positively associated with station profits. Second, station 
profits are higher in television markets with a high "code 
penetration" (i.e., where a large proportion of stations were 
subscribers). 
Acceptance of the first hypothesis will not by itself be 
sufficient to conclude that the code was effectively 
anticompetitive. If the code was a cartel, then individual 
station membership must marginally increase its effectiveness. 
But code membership can raise station profits in other ways. 
Display of code affiliation may signal a station's reputability 
to potential advertisers and to watchdog groups within the 
community. The code authority's monitoring of station compliance 
with NAB commercial and ethical standards reduces the probability 
of closer scrutiny by the FCC at license-renewal time. These 
latter considerations reduce station costs and risk, and may 
enhance profits, regardless of cartel effects. 
The second hypothesis is more straightforward. It is 
difficult to see how code penetration of a television market 
could affect station profit except through some kind of output 
restriction. Barring modeling inadequacies and sampling error, 
the absence of a link between profit and penetration suggests 
either that the code did not intend output restrictions or, due 
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to weak adherence and enforcement, it failed to carry out those 
,intentions. 
The hypotheses above focus on code effect and penetration 
in a local television market. The possibility that the code 
restricted the supply of commercials nationwide, thereby 
increasing all station profits simultaneously, is implausible and 
perhaps irrelevant. It is implausible because stations, with few 
exceptions, sell commercial exposures in a localized "area of 
dominant interest" (ADI). It may be irrelevant because those 
television trade association activities with likely nationwide 
effects, such as lobbying before Congress and the FCC for entry 
restrictions and other favors, are carried out not by the code 
authority but by the NAB itself. In any event, the national 
effects of supply restriction by the code cannot be estimated 
with the cross-sectional data base used below. 13 
The first difficulty in testing the empirical hypotheses 
is the unavailability of data on station profits. The proxy used 
here is the sale price of a television station, which should 
approximately equal the present value of a stream of anticipated 
net revenues. The advantage of this approach is that sale price 
data need no adjustment for deficiencies in accounting measures 
of profit. The disadvantages are that the potential sample is 
13Koford [(1984), n. 11] observes that reductions in the 
supply of commercial exposures may have an entry-limiting effect. 
Even this influence would likely b~ felt at the local, not 
national, level. 
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smaller and may be non-random, although the direction of bias, if 
any, could go either way.14 
The sale price of station i at time 0 can usefully be 
modeled as follows: 
(3a) 
where Ri is the component of, the station revenue stream which 
would obtain in the absence of any restrictive cartel, and RT is 
a monopoly profit component attributable to the workings of the 
code. 1s It is further assumed that: 
(3b) 
Rm[C ·, CP.(t), MS.(t)]
1 1 1 
Ai is the audience size or viewer share of station i, MS i is some 
measure of market structure in station i's ADI, and CP i is some 
measure of code penetration in the ADI. V., NET. and C. are 
1 1 1 
binary (dummy) variables set equal to 1 if the i th station is 
VHF, a network affiliate, or a code subscriber, respectively, and 
140ther approaches to station profit have been employed. 
Park, Johnson and Fishman had individual station profit data for 
their study at the Rand Corporation. Boyer and Wirth, who did 
not have such data, used the park, et al., regression equations 
to compute estimates of station profits. See Boyer and Wirth 
(1981), and references cited therein. 
lsWhile this separation is helpful for model building and 
exposition, there may be some monopoly rent in the first term 
because of FCC licensing restrictions. Greer writes: "When sold 
to new owners, prime stations go for prices many times the cost 
of their physical assets, a phenomenon explained by the fact that 
the intangible license rights are worth millions of dollars" 
[(1983), p. 356]. 
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set equal to 0 otherwise. The upper limit of integration in the 
second term of equation (3a) is T, which may be finite if 
stations accurately foresaw the demise of the code. Note that 
market structure will influence profitability directly, but may 
also influence the effectiveness of any collusive voluntary 
organization; hence, MS appears in both the Ri and RT components. 
The data base consists of observations on 74 commercial 
television stations which were sold between February 1977 and the 
NAB code suspension in March 1982. 16 For each station the sale 
price at time of sale, p(t}, and status with regard to the code 
approximately six months after the sale (C = 1 if subscriber) 
were recorded. 17 Additional variables were measured as of 
January 1980: number of television households in ADI (Nh ), type 
of station (V = 1 if VHF), number of stations in ADI (Ns ), number 
of VHF stations in ADI (Nv ), number of code subscribers in ADI 
(Nc ), NAB status (NAB = 1 if member), and network status (NET = 1 
if affiliate). The sources of these observations are 
VBroadcasting-Cablecasting Yearbook (for p(t), Nh , NS , N , V, and 
NET), Broadcasting (for p(t) in recent transactions), and spot 
Television Rates and Data (for NAB, C, and NET). 
16Non-commercial, satellite and translator stations were 
omitted from the sample, as were stations where a cable system or 
other assets were part of the transaction. One outlier (KOVR, 
Stockton, California) was also dropped since its market area lies 
between two larger markets and so the actual audience for the 
station cannot be estimated. 
17Status at this time should reflect the intentions of 
the new owners at the time of sale, when the possible benefits of 
membership would have been calculated in evaluating assets. 
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The 74 commercial stations in the sample are divided as 
. follows: 35 VHF stations, of which 32 are network affiliates and 
23 are members of the TV Code~ 39 UHF stations, of which 27 are 
network affiliates and 24 are code members. Of the 47 code 
member stations, only 9 are not also members of the NAB~ of 43 
NAB members, only 5 do not subscribe to the code. 
The raw data were transformed in a number of ways. 
Because station sales were spread over several years, the sale 
prices were adjusted to their estimated January 1980 equivalents 
by the formula P. = P.(O) = P.(t)e-gt' , where 9 = G/12 = .00873,1 1 1 
G is the geometric mean annual interest rate (Moody's Aaa bond 
yields) for the period 1977-1981, and t' is the number of months 
1 
between January 1980 and the date of sale. 18 
Station audience size is estimated as h sA. = N./N .•1 1 1 N~ 1 is 
the measure of market structure in the regressions below, and S. 
C S = N./N., the proportion of stations in the ADI who subscribed to 
1 1 
the code, is the measure of code penetration. Other measures of 
structure and penetration were tried, and their effects are 
discussed briefly at the end of section 3.3. 
All variables are scaled to have sample means between 0 
and 10. Ai is measured in units of 10,000 viewers, Pi in 
. . s v .. .$m1111ons, and Ni and Ni 1n stat10ns. The rema1ning variables 
are either 0-1 binary variables or decimal proportions. 
18Time t' = -1 in December 1979, 0 in January 1980, +1 in 
February 1980, and so on. 
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3.2 Regression Model 
A regression model for testing the empirical hypotheses 
will have to address the question of possible simultaneity: does 
code membership increase profit, do p~ofits encourage membership, 
or both? A "dummy endogenous variable" (DEV) model with two 
unobserved variables allows for both directions of causality.19 
* .Let Ei represent the (unobserved) effectiveness of the 
code in raising profits and reducing advertising market 
uncertainty for all stations in the i th AD!. Define c: as the 
(unobserved) incentive for station i to join the code. Then, 
making a linear adaptation of equations (3) and omitting i 
subscripts and constant terms, write: 
E* = alc + a'X + u
e 
e (4a) 
p = blC + b E* + b'X + uP 2 P (4b) 
c pC 0) cC* = E* + + e'X + u1 c (4c) 
C = 1 if C* > 0; c = 0 otherwise. (4d) 
Equation (4a) says that the code's effectiveness depends 
on market structure (Ns ), code penetration (S), and whether or 
not station i is a member (C). Since membership by any 
19This DEV model is based on the "hybrid" case in Heckman 
(1978), as modified by Maddala [(1983), sec. 5.8]. 
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individual station should at least marginally increase E*, while 
code penetration should have a pronounced effect, one expects, a 
priori, that ~ 0 and > O. A larger number of stationsa1 a 2
 
makes secret collusion more difficult [Stigler (1964)], but the
 
NAB code advertising restrictions were not secret, so ~ 0 is
a 3 
expected. 
Equation (4b) is the station "profit" equation, where 
profit depends on code status and market and station 
characteristics. The first empirical hypothesis is that b1 > 0, 
and the second that b2 > O. Because market structure affects 
profits directly as well as through code effectiveness, and 
because large values of NS ought to be associated with more 
intense competition in the ADI, b3 < 0 is anticipated. Because 
VHF stations have lower transmission costs and greater signal 
. clarity than UHF stations, network affiliates carry programs of 
greater mass popularity, and audience size is one dimension of 
output, one expects b4 , b5 , and b6 > O. 
In equation (4c), the incentive to join the code depends 
on code effectiveness, station profit if the station does not 
subscribe to the code (p<O) = P when b1 = 0), whether or not the 
station is also a member of the NAB, and the number of months (T) 
between the station sale and the 1982 suspension of the code's 
advertising provisions. C* is an index which is never observed, 
but if it exceeds a given threshold (set at 0 in equation (4d», 
station i subscribes to the code (C = 1). E* should have a 
positive influence on C*, but is unobserved and therefore 
unscaled; its coefficient is arbitrarily set at unity in (4c). 
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One expects c 2 > 0 because of the high proportion of NAB members 
who are code subscribers and vice versa. Variable T is included 
because of the possibility that T is finite in equation (3a). If 
stations became reluctant to join the code after the antitrust 
suit was filed in 1979, one could expect c 3 > O. If T merely 
captures some (reverse) time trend in membership, no a priori 
sign can be attributed to this parameter. 
The sign expectation of is problematic. If a stationc l 
is profitable without code membership, this very plausibly 
suggests that it will have reduced incentive to join and pay the 
subscription fees (i.e., that < 0). But the code fees arecl 
relatively small, although slightly discriminatory. 20 Since more 
profitable stations have more at stake in FCC license-renewal 
deliberations, code authority monitoring services would be more 
valuable to them•. Furthermore, it is alleged that large firms 
generally favor planned, orderly market environments. 21 If the 
code was capable of providing focal points for supply, pricing, 
and other dimensions of conduct, this would be especially 
attractive to the larger stations. But these considerations lead 
to the expectation that c1 > O. The matter is further obfuscated 
by the game-strategic nature of collusion. Larger stations might 
contribute more to the effectiveness of the code as a cartel, 
then have more incentive to cheat on any agreed-upon 
2°The fees vary according to a station's total revenue, 
whether or not it is a network affiliate, and whether it is VHF 
or UHF. 
2 
1This thesis is central to Galbraith's New Industrial 
state (1967), for example. 
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arrangements. Their very size makes detection of cheating more 
likely, however, and increases the size of potential losses in 
any ensuing advertising price war. In short, the sign of isc l 
very much an empirical question. 
Before equations (4) can be estimated, a "logical 
consistency condition" must be imposed. The use of unobserved 
variables in a simultaneous equation context implies parameter 
restrictions not encountered in analogous linear models. After 
substituting (4a) and (4b) into (4c), the reduced form incentive 
equation becomes: 
Put simply, the probability of the event "joins the code" 
(C*) cannot depend on whether or not the event has already 
occurred (C = 0 or 1). Hence, a l (1+c1b ) ~ust equal zero, which2 
implies = 0 or = -1. The empirical hypotheses ofa l c l b2 
interest here must at minimum permit b
2 
= 0, so = 0 is thea1 
chosen restriction, and C is dropped from equation (4a).22 
Eliminating equation (4a) and imposing the logical 
consistency condition yields the following "partially reduced 
form" regression model: 
22This logical consistency condition is derived 
rigorously in Maddala [(1983), p. 1181. 
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sP.
1 = 13 0 + 131Ci + 13 2Si + 13 3Ni + 13 4Vi 
(6a) 
+ 135NETi + 13 6Ai + w'R 1 
C. *
1 = 'YO + 'Y1Si + 'Y2N
s
i + 'Y3Vi + 'Y4NET i 
(6b)c+ + + + W.'Y5Ai 1'6NAB i 1'7Ti 1 
* C. = 1 if C. > 0; C. = 0 otherwise. 1 1 1 (6c) 
The correspondence between the original model parameters of 
equations (4) and the regression coefficients of equations (6) is 
detailed in Table 1. Note that none of the profit equation 
coefficients depends on c l ' and that b1 , b4 , b5 , b6 , c2 and c 3 
can be estimated directly. Coefficients 'Y3' 1'4 an~ 1'5 will 
provide the least ambiguous estimates of (the sign of) and 13 2c l ' 
the least ambiguous estimate of b2• 
3.3 Regression Results 
The identification and estimation of equations (6) are 
discussed in Maddala and Lee (1976) and extended in Maddala 
[(1983), sec. 5.7]. Two-stage nonlinear least squares (2NLS) is 
an asymptotically efficient estimation technique. With C 
replacing C*, equation (6b) can be estimated by probit maximum 
likelihood methods and the fitted index c* calculated. If the 
cumulative normal probabilities F(C*) are be substituted for C, 
equation (6a) can then be estimated by OLS. The model is 
identified even if no exogenous variables are excluded from 
either equation: because F(C*) is a nonlinear function of 
included RHS variables, perfect mUlticollinearity does not arise 
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TABLE 1
 
STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
 
Profit Equation Incentive Equation 
13 1 = bl = a 2 (1+cl b2 )11 
(32 = a2b2 12 = a 3 (1+cl b2 ) + c l b3 
13 3 = a3b2 + b3 13 = c l b4 
13 4 = b4 14 = clbS 
{3S = bS 1S = c l b6 
{36 = b6 16 = c 2 
17. = c 3 
e C C wP = b u + uP w = (1+Cl b2 )u
e + c uP + U2 1 
in the second stage. In the regressions reported below, NAB and 
T are excluded from the profit equation, which reduces the 
otherwise high multicollinearity that may cloud the second stage 
estimates. 
The regressions reported in this paper were run using 
William H. Greene's LIMDEP program. The results are contained in 
Table 2. Regression summary statistics include the unadjusted R2 
and the Amemiya prediction criterion (PC) for the profit 
equations, the "pseudo-R2" and McFadden prediction success index 
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(PSI) for the probit equations, and the chi-square likelihood 
. ratio test statistic. 23 
Columns (la) and (lb) of Table 2 present the probit and 
2NLS estimates of equations (6b) and (6a), respectively. The 
profit equation results indicate that 13 3 , 13 4 , 13 5 , and 13 6 are131 ' 
significantly positive, but 13 2 , the coefficient of S, is not 
significantly different from zero (with t-ratio = 0.26). Thus, 
the first empirical hypothesis, that code membership yields 
higher profits (sale price) is substantiated, even after possible 
simultaneity has been accounted for. The second empirical 
hypothesis, that profits are higher where code penetration is 
deeper, is not substantiated. VHF stations, network affiliates, 
and stations with larger average audience sizes all show higher 
sale prices, as expected. 
Additional insight can be gained by comparing the 
regression results of Table 2 with the original structural form 





and 13 6 > 0 imply that b4 , b5 , and b6 > O. But 13' 14' and 15 are 
negative, with ~4 and 15 significantly so. The implication seems 
to be that ~ O. Evidently, the more profitable a station isc1
 
without code membership, the less incentive it has to subscribe
 
and pay the fees. While not unreasonable, this result suggests
 
that either the code was not perceived as capable of ensuring a
 
2~PC penalizes the inclusion of extraneous variables more 
that the R2; a lower PC suggests a better fit [Judge, et. ale 
(1982), p. 603]. Pseudo-R 2 measures are discussed in Judge, et. 
ale [(1982), p. 525] and Maddala [(1983), p. 39], and McFadden's 
normalized PSI in Maddala [(1983), pp. 76-77]. 
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TABLE 2 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
Regression Number, Type, and Dependent Variable( 1) 
(la) (lb) (2 ) ( 3) 
Probit 2NLS OLS OLS 
C P P p 
Con. -7.80** -11.19** -10.67** -11.20** 
C -.- 0.06* 5.02** -. ­
S 9.91** 0.66 -4.30 0.72 
0.63** 0.87* 0.64 0.87** 
V -0.24 6.29** 5.88** 6.29** 
NET -2.26* 8.47** 8.21** 8.48** 
A -0.37** 0.92** 1.03** 0.92** 
NAB 3.95**
 
T 0.07** -.- -. ­
Summary Statistics( z)
 
0.68 0.42 0.48 0.42 




66.1 46.8 48.7 39.4 
(l)Sample size = 74; *(**) = significant at 5% (1%) 
level (one-tail z-test). 
(Z)R Z = "pseudo-R zn for probit; PC = Arnemiya 
prediction criterion; PSI" = McFadden prediction success 
index; xZ = likelihood ratio test statistic. 
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"more orderly" television advertising market, or else this 
capability was not highly valued by larger stations. 
Accepting the statistical hypothe~is that ~2 = 0 implies 
that a2 = 0 or b2 = O. If b2 = 0, code effectiveness in general 
(E*) did not influence station profits in equation (4b). If 
= 0, code penetration does not increase the code'sa2 
effectiveness in equation (4a). But a2 = 0 implies ~l = 0, and 
~l is significantly positive in Table 2. It is tentatively 
concluded that b2 = 0, then, and that the only effect, if any, of 
code penetration is to increase the incentive to join the code 
(through E*) in equation (4c). 
If c l S 0 and b2 = 0, then ~3 > 0 implies b3 > 0, and 
~2 > 0 implies a 3 > -cl b3 ~ O. That is, the number of stations 
has a non-negative influence on code effectiveness, contrary to 
expectation a la Stigler, and has a positive influence on station 
profit, contrary to the anticipated effect of increased 
competition. On reflection, these results are not surprising. 
Large values of NS will be associated with large metropolitan 
television markets where spectrum limitations and FCC license 
allocation make entry barriers absolute and binding. 24 Station 
asset values, including the intangibles, are naturally higher in 
such areas. High entry barriers make successful output 
restriction more profitable, possibly explaining the positive 
sign for a 3 in equation (4a) and ~2 in equation (6b). 
2
4 Because of FCC spectrum allocation, most cities have 
only up to three commercial television stations. These tend to 
be both VHF and network affiliates [Greer (1983), pp. 350-51]. 
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Finally, note that 16 > 0, due to the close association 
between code and NAB membership status. ~7 > 0 implies c 3 > 0 in 
equation (4c); the closer the "demise" of the code's advertising 
provisions, the less the station's incentive to join. 
To summarize thus far, it appears that it is profitable 
for a station to subscribe to the code (b > O), that code1 
effectiveness as a potential cartel does not directly increase 
station profit (b2 = O), but does increase the incentive of 
stations to subscribe (a2 and a 3 > O), the latter influence being 
felt indirectly through an entry barrier effect. These are mixed 
results. With b2 = 0, it seems unlikely that the code enjoyed 
any success as an output-reducing collusive device, especially 
since b1 > 0 can be explained without reference to cartel 
behavior. But the indirect effects of market structure, code 
penetration, and time until suspension, operating through the 
incentive equation, may also help explain why b1 is positive, 
thereby leaving open the possibility that the code did, in fact, 
enjoy some cartel success. Further analysis makes this doubtful, 
however. 
To begin with, the DEV model allows for simultaneity 
between profit and code incentive functions. But if the error 
terms in (6a) and (6b) are independent, the profit equation can 
be efficiently estimated by OLS. Looking again at Table 1, it 
Ccan be seen that wP and w are independent if b2 = c l = o. Since 
it appears from the DEV estimates that b2 = 0 and c1 S 0, with 
the evidence on c1 being very indirect (through the probit 
equation); this possibility must be addressed. A "Hausman test" 
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for simultaneity could perhaps be employed here,25 but such a 
test is unnecessary. Column (2) of Table 2 estimates equation 
(6a) with OLS. ~l' ~4' ~5 and ~6 are significantly positive, as 
before. P2 is negative (but insignificant), and ~3 is 
insignificantly positive. These are not substantially different 
results from those obtained with the DEV model code membership 
enhances profit, but code penetration does not but there are 
no indirect effects through an incentive equation. 
Second, the code penetration variable S = NC/Ns is 
related by construction to C: the in-sample biserial correlation 
between C and S is 0.6460. 26 Since S is so important in 
evaluating the influence of the "cartel" on profits, the possible 
collinearity between Sand C must be examined. Column (3) of 
T~ble 2 estimates the profit equation by OLS with C omitted. The 
coefficient of S is positive, but still insignificant (t­
ratio = 0.28).27 Collinearity does not account for the 
insignificant (and sometimes negative) coefficients of S in 
previous regressions. 
Finally, the regressions reported in Table 2, where S is 
used for CP and NS for MS, provided the strongest support, 
however weak, for the hypothesis that station profit is partly 
attributable to the effectiveness of the NAB code in reducing the 
25See Hausman (1978). 
26Biserial correlation is defined in Kendall and Stuart 
[(1973), pp. 319-23]. 
27When S is dropped, C remains significantly positive in 
OLS estimates of the profit equation. 
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supply of output in a station's ADI. NV , the number of VHF 
stations, was tried as a measure of structure which might capture 
the "dominant (VHF) group with competitive fringe" aspects of 
local-television markets. A single-station monopoly dummy 
variable (M = 1 if NS = 1) was included in some of the trial 
regressions. Sm = S(l-M) was employed as an alternate code 
penetration variable which recognizes that a single station 
cannot "collude." In these preliminary regressions, NV was never 
. ·f· Sm d . . d h 2 d 2slgn1 1cant, an M were never pos1t1ve, an t e R , pseu o-R , 
and PC values were lower than for the regressions in Table 2. 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
The theory developed in part 1 demonstrates the ability 
of a television trade association to raise industry profit by 
reducing the number of commercials, even though the actual 
product is commercial exposures. It is not clear to what extent 
this extra profit might be eroded by increased competition along 
the dimensions of program quality, type, and scheduling. It is 
clear, however, that the Justice Department brought an antitrust 
suit against the NAB for restricting the number of commercials. 
If the suit had economic justification, then the prosecution must 
have believed that the commercial restrictions either could have 
or actually did raise station profits above the competitive 
level. 
Under a per se rule, the government's case is 
substantiated if the television code could have raised profits 
(through cartel operations). But under a rule of reason, 
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normally applied in trade association cases, the successful 
prosecution of the suit would require evidence that the code 
actually did raise station profits. 
The empirical results in this paper are based on such 
indirect evidence as is available. They consistently show that 
stations which subscribed to the code were more profitable than 
stations which did not, but that code penetration in the local 
market area had no discernible direct effect on profits. A 
simultaneous equation model, used to deal with the possibility 
that profits generate code membership as well as the other way 
around, did reveal an indirect effect of penetration on the 
incentive to subscribe. 
In interpreting these results, it must be kept in mind 
that code membership may be profitable for reasons unrelated to 
cartel output restrictions. The code provided monitoring and 
other services to members for a nominal (if discriminatory) fee. 
These services reduce station risk at license renewal time. 
Membership may also be valuable in signalling the station's 
reputability to potential advertisers and interested community 
groups. 
Thus, a finding of anticompetitive or cartel effect of 
the code depends heavily on the code penetration variable. 
Surely a cartel is more effective in any given market area the 
higher the proportion of members it has. Yet the various 
measures of penetration seem only weakly and indirectly related 
to station profitability in the "best" simultaneous equation 
regressions (i.e., those in Table 2). OLS regressions show no 
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positive link between profit and code penetration, however 
measured. 
Given these results, our findings are that: ·(1) the 
television code did not successfully increase member station 
profits through restrictions on the output of commercial 
exposures, (2) code membership appears to have been profitable, 
but for reasons which were probably unrelated to the antitrust 
suit, and therefore (3) the government's antitrust suit was 
economically ill-advised, especially if a "rule of reason" was to 
be applied to evaluating industry conduct and performance. 
These findings are deliberately cautious for both legal 
and statistical reasons. Had the antitrust case been decided in 
court under a rule of reason, the NAB would have to be acquitted 
unless found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence in 
this paper against the NAB is based on indirect estimates 
obtained with asymptotically efficient methods applied to a 
possibly non-random sample of 74 proxy observations on station 
profits. It hurts us to say so, but "further research is 
required." In particular, a cross-sectional census of actual 
station profits and audience size for, say, 1978 (before the code 
was challenged), combined with a model on the order of equations 
(4), could undoubtedly deliver much more definitive results. 
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